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14 March 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJECT : Special Reserve Panel Study

1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. As guidelines for future Agency planning, we believe the recommendations of the subject study are insufficiently supported to warrant general acceptance. CIA must and will undertake special preparations to meet various wartime contingencies; but in matters involving the survival or, in the least, the wartime strategy and tactics of CIA as a component of U. S. overseas forces, it is essential that CIA plans be responsive to those of the Department of Defense. In this regard, we feel that the study has fallen short in its evaluation of the wartime role of the Agency.
3. More specifically, the following comments are submitted:
 - a. Page 6, para. 1

There is no question that early warning is of the highest priority, but we believe there is little basis for possible conflict between preparations to ensure early warning and those to ensure satisfaction of military requirements levied upon and accepted by CIA.
 - b. Page 6, para. 2

The assumption that massive nuclear exchange in the initial stage of hostilities is well taken, but this must not preclude the military or CIA from being prepared to meet all reasonable contingencies. CIA should continue to accept the responsibility for all military requirements for which it has a current or potential capability.
 - c. Page 6, para. 3

The concept of this paragraph should apply across-the-board and should neither be qualified nor limited to areas of nuclear exchange.
 - d. Page 6, para. 4

This is an excellent concept in application to areas outside active theaters of war, but in regard to "strategic islands" we should also expect the military to plan for and utilize such areas to advantage.

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e. Page 6, para. 5

For CIA's unique communications requirements it is expected that alternate, flexible communications systems will be established or held available. On the other hand, the Department of Defense will also make provision for necessary alternate ACAN or similar facilities to handle traffic between overseas and the ZI. It is unlikely that CIA overseas elements in the capacity of a "fourth service" would be denied accommodation by military communications. If military alternate facilities were to go out completely, we believe it improbable that CIA would initiate unilateral staff communication operations between the ZI and overseas.

f. Page 7, para. 6

The proposed study to determine "strategic and tactical islands" is of some merit. On the other hand, it is believed that such a study may be of greater importance to the military and should actually be undertaken by it.

g. Page 7, para. 7

It is questionable whether it is within the province of CIA to attempt to influence U. S. national planners (assuming they consist of the NSC and the JCS) by any means other than acting in its statutory role as intelligence advisor to the President and the NSC.

h. Page 7, para. 9

It is believed that any guidelines for war planning should reflect the wartime mission of CIA. We do not believe that the study has accomplished this effectively.

- i. We note repeated use of the phrase "broken back" war. This is a new one, but assume that it has reference to retaliatory or resistance activities which would take place in an area (either our own or the enemy's) which has been devastated by nuclear warfare. If so, this phrase should be amplified or explained.
- j. Several references are made to surrender negotiations which might occur after a short period of nuclear exchange. We are unable to understand whether they refer to surrender negotiations instituted by us or surrender negotiations instituted by the enemy. This should be clarified.

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k. We agree with the points made in regard to the difficulties inherent in the present overseas theater evacuation plans, in that they are based on removal of American personnel, including members of CIA, from forward areas back into rear areas which might very well themselves be the targets of enemy nuclear attack. However, this comes largely within the principle enunciated by Bairnsfather's Ole Bill in World War I when he stated, "If you know of a better hole, then go to it." The "strategic islands" and "tactical islands" which are mentioned repeatedly throughout the study will be difficult to perceive and designate at this stage of the game. In any event, the theater planners, primarily the military, are always in the best position to determine the proper situs of evacuation destinations, and will always remain so, although the dangers pointed out in the study should be borne in mind by them.

4. It is further suggested that the study overlooks special preparations covering the following:

- a. Increased demand of intelligence community upon DD/I resources, Basic Intelligence for example.
- b. Step-up of the monitoring of all concerned Federal Government agencies to cover increased use of radio communications by the opposition as they lose land lines.
- c. Increased demand for trained security personnel and for security information.
- d. Increased numbers of qualified personnel needed to search the document stockpile of the Agency.

5. We believe that the study does offer a significant contribution in that it is entirely possible that CIA's greatest effort in support of the military may be initially in those areas not directly involved in military conflict.

6. A good point to question is why a study so fundamental in its nature, and one which should be a matter of continuing Central Intelligence Agency study and review, should be executed by a group of the Agency's reserve officers (apparently carrying on the study as part of their activities in the Army Reserve component in the Agency).

Special Planning Assistant
to the
Deputy Director (Support)

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